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Abstract
In this paper we compare the performance of various homomorphic encryption methods on a private
search scheme that can achieve k-anonymity privacy. To make our benchmarking fair, we use open sourced
cryptographic libraries which are written by experts and well scrutinized. We find that Goldwasser-Micali
encryption achieves good enough performance for practical use, whereas fully homomorphic encryptions
are much slower than partial ones like Goldwasser-Micali and Paillier.
1 Introduction
How to securely and privately search over encrypted dataset has been popular in research community for
the past decade [27, 28, 32, 33, 11, 10, 1]. A private search scheme should allow the client to have access to
one of the posting lists in the inverted index, while the server hosting the index cannot tell which posting
is accessed by the client. Also for privacy concern, the client should not know any other posting except the
legally requested one. To address this problem, one possible way is to leverage Homomorphic Encryption
[21, 22, 37, 38, 19, 4, 5]. Recently there is some debate over the question whether such a homomorphic
encryption based private search scheme can be practically used [40, 36, 1]. We note that it is important which
encryption method is used, since the involved operations may be very different, e.g., there are many modular
exponential operations in Paillier [37, 38], while Goldwasser-Micali only requires quadratic exponentiation;
some lattice based HEs (e.g. [6, 4]) require noise management techniques such as bootstrapping [16], re-
linearization [6] and approximate eigenvector [20], which need more time. It will be interesting to see which
HE method outperforms others in performance.
The main objective of this paper is to compare the performance on private search given by existing
homomorphic encryption methods. The main challenge is that to write a cryptographic library is time-
consuming and error-prone. Thus to do a fair comparison, we need well written libraries which are publicly
available and have been scrutinized by experts. Fortunately there are many published libraries available
for Homomorphic Encryption [26, 24, 23, 12], and many of them are written by the original paper authors
[23, 12]. We will do a benchmark for each library and compare the performance results.
2 Preliminaries and Related Works
2.1 Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption (HE) is an encryption system that allows some computations over ciphertexts
without knowing the plaintexts or secret keys. A homomorphic encryption that allows the computation of
any circuit (including additions and multiplications) over ciphertexts is called Fully Homomorphic Encryption
(FHE). If the computation scope is restricted (e.g., only addition or multiplication by some constant), it is
called Partially Homomorphic Encryption (PHE).
• Partially Homomorphic Encryption: There is a line of research works that can support HE with any
times of additions: ElGamal [14], Goldwasser-Micali [21, 22], Benaloh [2], Paillier [37, 38], etc. A PHE
Enc supporting addition can compute Enc(m1 +m2) only given the ciphertexts Enc(m1) and Enc(m2).
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Furthermore, Goldwasser-Micali can support the muliplication of two bits, i.e., to compute Enc(b1b2)
only given Enc(b1) and Enc(b2) where b1, b2 ∈ {0, 1}. Paillier can support multiplication by constant,
i.e., to compute Enc(m1m2) only given Enc(m1) and m2 where m1, m2 are plaintexts. However, PHE
cannot support addition and multiplication over ciphertext simultaneously.
• Fully Homomorphic Encryption: Since the first time to be proposed by Craig Gentry [16], there is a
long line of research works on FHE [45, 41, 42, 15, 18, 17, 6, 4, 3, 20, 5, 7]. So far most FHE schemes are
built on difficult lattice problems [39]. By FHE, one may arbitrarily compute over ciphertexts, e.g., add
and multiply for many times. The major challenge in the design of FHE is noise management, i.e., the
noise in ciphertext grows rapidly when multiplying [6, 7]. Thus some time-consuming techniques like
squashing [16, 15, 18, 17, 13], bootstrapping [16], re-linearization [6, 7], approximate eigenvector [20]
are needed. The difficulty of noise management makes it very challenging to improve the performance
of FHE in practice, and there is a long way to go to make an efficient FHE implementation by industry
standard [35].
2.2 Private Information Retrieval and Private Search
A private information retrieval (PIR) scheme allows the client to obtain a posting in the inverted index
from the server, while the server cannot learn which posting is requested by the client. Clearly the most
trivial way is to give all the postings to the client. This takes too much bandwidth, and the client learns
everything: if it is a dataset of medical records, the client learns the private information from anyone else.
Hence a private search scheme further requires that the client cannot learn any other information except the
requested posting.
There is a line of research on PIR [27, 9, 28, 32, 33]. These works tried to reduce the computation
time and communication overhead of PIR by assuming some computational intractability, e.g., quadratic
residuosity problem [21, 22], learning with errors [39], etc. So far the best result given by [33] is that the
computation time is O(n/ logn) and the communication overhead is O(log2 n) where n is the size of dataset
and the client requests one bit in the dataset.
Note that a PIR scheme that has absolutely no leakage is widely considered to be inefficient in practice
(e.g., the response time can be 10 to 1000 seconds) [40, 36]. However, if we allow some acceptable leakage,
can we obtain an efficient PIR scheme that can be used in the real world? In this paper we investigate this
possibility.
2.3 k-Anonymity Privacy
As a standard notion of privacy, together with its variants [34, 31], k-anonymity has been researched for many
years [44, 43, 29, 30, 34, 31]. A key-value based dataset has k-anonymity if the value for each key cannot
be distinguished from at least k− 1 other values whose keys also appear in the dataset. For a k-anonymous
search scheme, for each request from the client, there always exist k entries in the inverted index such that
the server cannot tell which one of these k entries is requested by the client. There is absolutely no leakage
if k equals the number of entries in the inverted index.
3 A Private Search Scheme Achieving k-Anonymity
In this paper we investigate the performance of the private search scheme given as Algorithm 1. The HE
based idea of this scheme is similar to [27, 28, 32, 33, 1].
Clearly the computation time of the scheme as above is O(kp) and the communication overhead is
O(k + p). The correctness can be verified as follows.
Decsk(es) = Decsk(
k∑
j=1
Encpk(bj) ·Dj[s]) = Decsk(Encpk(
k∑
j=1
bj ·Dj[s])) = Decsk(Encpk(Di[s])) = Di[s].
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Algorithm 1: A k-anonymous private search scheme.
Data: D: the inverted index containing k posting lists: D1, · · ·, Dk;
i: the index of the posting that the client requests; p: the length of posting list, i.e., p = |Dj | for any
index j;
Enc: a PHE supporting addition and multiplication by constant with public key pk and secrete key sk.
Result: The client learns Di and nothing more, while the server cannot tell i.
1 For each index j ∈ [1, k], the client computes cj = Encpk(bj) where bj equals to 1 if i = j and 0
otherwise;
2 The client sends C = {c1, · · · , ck} to the server;
3 For each offset s ∈ [1, p], the server computes es =
∑k
j=1 cj ·Dj[s], where Dj [s] denotes the s-th bit in
the posting Dj ;
4 The server sends E = {e1, · · · , ep} to the client;
5 The client decrypts each ciphertext es in E by using sk to recover the posting list Di;
For practical use, very often we do not need too large k (e.g., at most 100). However, the number of entries
in the inverted index can be much larger. One possible solution is to divide the inverted index into several
blocks with size k, and the client lets the server know which block will be requested. A leakage immediately
follows since now the server knows which block is frequently requested, and thus the search pattern is not
completely hidden. But if we only require k-anonymous, then the postings within one block are k-anonymous
since the server cannot tell which one of them is requested.
4 Evaluation Results
In this section we summarize the evaluation results. By running similarly implemented testing code, we run
the homomorphic encryption based private search schemes using the libraries as follows:
• Praveen Kumar’s C library libgm [26] implementing the Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem.
• Gustavo Brunoro’s Python code [8] implementing the Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem. We denote this
code as PyGM.
• Mike Ivanov’s Python library [24] implementing the Paillier cryptosystem.
• Our Python code based on [8] implementing the Cachin-Micali scheme [9].1
• Shai Halevi and Victor Shoup’s HElib [23] (written in C++) implementing the Brakerski-Gentry-
Vaikuntanathan (BGV) scheme [4, 5].
• Leo Ducas and Daniele Micciancio’s FHEW [12] (written in C++) implementing their own FHE scheme
[13].
For the schemes which need large primes, we generate 2048-bit primes, which are considered to be secure so
far [25]. For the lattice or LWE based FHE schemes, we use the minimum security configuration given by
the authors. We choose the posting length to be 720 bits. We consider different k’s in k-anonymity when
evaluating.
We run the experiments on Linux Ubuntu 16.04 servers with 8 cores of 2.4 GHz AMD FX8320, 16GB
memory. Since some libraries do not provide enough interfaces (e.g., except for encryption and decryp-
tion, FHEW only provides ciphertext evaluation for NAND to use), we cannot guarantee that all of our
implementation are optimal.
1Cachin-Micali scheme is a PIR scheme, not a HE system.
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libgm PyGM Paillier Cachin-Micali HElib FHEW
0.84 0.015 0.024 0.40 6.13 14.8
Table 1: Key generation time (sec) for different k’s.
k libgm PyGM Paillier Cachin-Micali HElib FHEW
10 0.02 0.0002 0.93 0.40 1.03 6.8e-5
20 0.03 0.0004 1.86 0.57 2.04 1.3e-4
50 0.07 0.0007 4.59 1.59 5.18 3.3e-4
100 0.15 0.0012 19.90 3.02 15.76 6.7e-4
Table 2: Query encryption time (sec) for different k’s.
4.1 Key Generation Time
Table 1 gives the key generation time results. Goldwasser-Micali and Paillier are the best. Note that libgm
uses GNU MP Bignum library, while PyGM uses Miller-Rabin to test primality. GNU MP generates large
primes that are safer to use, but takes more time.
4.2 Query Encryption Time
Table 2 gives the query encryption time results. Goldwasser-Micali and FHEW achieve the best performance.
4.3 Query Execution Time
The query execution includes the time that the server uses to generate the ciphertext to return based on the
query, and the decryption time on the client side.
Table 3 gives the query execution time results. Goldwasser-Micali scheme achieves the best performance.
Note that FHE schemes (HElib and FHEW) take more time on the additions and multiplications over
ciphertexts, since the noise in ciphertexts grows rapidly by multiplication and hence the scheme needs to
control the noise.
4.4 Communication Overhead
Table 4 gives the communication overhead results. We evaluate communication overhead as the number of
bytes communicated between the client and server during the private search protocol. Goldwasser-Micali,
Cachin-Micali and Paillier achieve the best performance, and their overhead grows slowly as k increases.
5 Conclusion and Future Works
Based on the benchmarking results, Goldwasser-Micali encryption achieves good enough performance for
practical use, whereas fully homomorphic encryptions are much slower than partial ones like Goldwasser-
k libgm PyGM Paillier Cachin-Micali HElib FHEW
10 0.172 0.113 0.307 0.43 1.61 16k
20 0.175 0.130 0.316 0.81 3.08 33k
50 0.185 0.164 0.361 1.87 7.70 82k
100 0.214 0.232 0.440 6.09 20.93 164k
Table 3: Query execution time (sec) for different k’s.
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k libgm PyGM Paillier Cachin-Micali HElib FHEW
10 11680 6440 6440 6528 1408 22k
20 11840 6512 6512 6600 2688 42k
50 12320 6776 6776 6864 6528 102k
100 13120 7160 7160 7248 12928 202k
Table 4: Communication overhead (bytes) for different k’s.
Micali and Paillier. We suggest that it may be worthwhile to research on the possibility of incorporating
Goldwasser-Micali method into private search scheme in the future works.
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